SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we
hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the
more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW-PERMANENT
DISABILITY-1980
FOR

MINOR

AMENDMENT

ELIMINATES

INJURIES--DEMONSTRABLE

OBJECTIVE

FUNCTIONAL RESTRICTION REQUIRED-Perez v.

PARTIAL

COMPENSATION
EVIDENCE

OF

Pantasote, Inc., 95

N.J. 105, 469 A.2d 22 (1984).
In 1980, the New Jersey Legislature extensively amended the
Workers' Compensation Act. Prior to the amendment, practically no
claim was rejected when the only issue was the existence of disability.
As a consequence, the cost of workers' compensation insurance became substantial. One of the most important provisions in the amendment was a statutory definition of partial permanent disability. This
definition was designed to eliminate compensation for minor partial
injuries, to increase compensation for serious injuries, and to control
the cost of workers' insurance. 95 N.J. at 111-13, 469 A.2d at 25-26.
The first interpretation of this definition by the New Jersey Supreme
Court came in Perez v. Pantasote, Inc., 95 N.J. 105, 469 A.2d 22
(1984).
Miguel Perez suffered a twisted ankle while working for his
employer, Pantasote, Inc. After a short period out of work and minor
medical treatments, he resumed his normal duties. Perez subsequently
submitted a claim for permanent partial disability which asserted that
he could not work as fast as before and that he sometimes had pain
and swelling in his ankle. During a workers' compensation proceeding, Perez's physician testified that he had examined Perez about six
months after the accident and determined the permanent disability of
the foot to be twenty percent. Pantasote, Inc.'s physician testified that
he examined Perez about one year after the accident and found no
permanent disability. The Judge of Compensation determined that
there was some residual functional disability to the extent of five
percent, and a claim was awarded accordingly. Upon respondent's
appeal, the appellate division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme
Court granted respondent's petition for certification. Id. at 109-10,
469 A.2d at 24-25.
Justice Schreiber, writing for a unanimous court, noted that the
current workers' compensation provision defined permanent partial
disability as: "a permanent impairment caused by a compensable
accident or compensable occupational disease, based upon demonstrable function of the body or of its members or organs; considered shall
be whether there has been a lessening to a material degree of an
employee's working ability." Id. at 110, 469 A.2d at 25 (quoting N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34:15-36 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984)). The court
viewed the first step in evaluating a claim to be "[a] satisfactory
showing [by the employee] of demonstrable objective medical evi-
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dence of a functional restriction of the body, its members or organs."
Justice Schreiber noted that such a showing is no longer satisfied by a
party's subjective complaints. After the permanent disability is established by objective evidence, the court stated that the next step is to
ascertain whether the injury is sufficiently serious to warrant compensation. Id. at 116, 469 A.2d at 28. Justice Schreiber observed that the
first factor to be considered is whether an appreciable impairment of
the employee's work ability has occurred. Justice Schreiber noted that
if there has been an appreciable impairment, the claim is compensable. If there has not been, other criteria must be examined. A second
factor which the court identified is "whether there has been a disability in the broader sense of impairment in carrying on the 'ordinary
pursuits of life.' " In construing this factor, the court determined that
a condition not impairing working ability will be compensable only if
it substantially interferes with another aspect of the employee's life.
Id. at 116-17, 469 A.2d at 28-29.
Reviewing the record, the court concluded that the Judge of
Compensation had not followed the statutory requirements and had
not set down adequate findings. The court found that the judge had
not asserted that his determination was based upon demonstrable
objective medical evidence. Nor had the Judge of Compensation articulated whether there was a "lessening to a material degree of the
employee's working ability," or whether, nevertheless, the injury was
sufficiently serious to substantially affect other aspects of the employee's life. The court also questioned the merits of Perez's physician's
examination since it was performed a year before the hearing and "the
validity of a medical finding of a permanent injury may decrease with
the passage of time." Accordingly, the court remanded the cause for
further proceedings. Id. at 118-20, 469 A.2d at 29-30.
By strictly construing the statutory definition of permanent partial disability, the New Jersey Supreme Court has demonstrated its
commitment to the comprehensive reform of workers' compensation
law. The court has articulated a clear test to deal with the difficult
problem of evaluating disability claims.
Richard Muccino
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-TIDELANDS

AMENDMENTS-

AMENDMENT PROVIDING TIME BAR ON STATE CLAIMS TO RIPARIAN

LANDS DOES NOT VIOLATE FEDERAL OR STATE CONSTITUTIONS-

Dickinson v. Fund for the Support of Free Pub. Schools, 95 N.J.
65, 469 A.2d 1 (1983).
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In November, 1981, New Jersey voters passed an amendment to
the state constitution for the purpose of ameliorating the confusion
surrounding riparian lands.- This tidelands amendment barred state
claims to land previously tidally flowed but not so flowed for forty
years unless during that period the state had "specifically defined and
asserted" such claim. If the forty-year period had expired on or before
November 3, 1981, the state was given an additional year in which to
assert its claim. 95 N.J. at 70, 469 A.2d at 3.
Prior to passage of the amendment, the Legislature had enacted
Title 13, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1B-13,1-13.6 (West 1979 & Cum.
Supp. 1983-1984), which required the Tideland's Resource Council to
perform studies and surveys of meadowlands so that it could define
and certify those lands belonging to the state. Title 13 additionally
gave the Council the authority to sell the state's interest, with the net
proceeds being paid to the Fund for the Support of Free Public
Schools (Fund). 95 N.J. at 74, 469 A.2d at 5-6. The Council investigated and prepared a map of tidal lands which the state potentially
owned. The map, which was not inclusive of all riparian areas,
consisted of a series of 1.5 mile squares. About forty percent of the
squares consisted of nothing more than aerial maps (photomaps) of
the land. These squares were uncolored. The remaining sixty percent
of the squares were colored and were composed of both photomaps
and a detailed delineation (claim overlay) of high water marks, thus
specifying the riparian lands the state was claiming. See id. at 81, 469
A.2d at 9.
A suit was filed by various education interests and landowners
challenging the constitutionality of the tidelands amendment. Id. at
70, 469 A.2d at 3-4. The trial court did not address the constitutional
issues inasmuch as it determined that the map prepared by the Council in an effort to define state claims did so in a satisfactory manner,
thereby making the constitutional challenges moot. Both parties appealed the decision. See id. at 71-72, 469 A.2d at 4.
In a divided opinion, the appellate division reversed. Judge
Greenberg, writing for the majority, found no merits in the plaintiffs'
constitutional challenges. The court, however, concluded that portions of the Council's maps did not satisfy the tideland amendment's
requirements to assert and define its tidal claims. Justice Greenberg
reasoned that "only those bare photomaps with a scribed overlay
depicting a line where it was alleged the water had tidally flowed was
sufficient." In addition, the appellate division determined that the
state bore the burden of proving that land had been tidally flowed and
that the mapping techniques to be used for purposes of the amendment had to meet the requirements of Title 13. Id. at 72, 469 A.2d at
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4-5. Plaintiffs petitioned for certification to the state supreme court
and defendants cross-petitioned. Id. at 73, 469 A.2d at 5. Both petitions were jgranted.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in
part. Id. at 90, 469 A.2d at 14. Justice Schreiber, writing for the
majority, rejected the appellate division's contention that the mapping requirements of Title 13 must be adhered to by the state in order
to "specifically define and assert its claim pursuant to law." The court
noted that the methodology employed by Title 13 was adopted to
enable the Council "to determine and certify those lands which it
finds are State owned lands." Justice Schreiber pointed out, however,
that the tidelands amendment was less vigorous in that it only required assertion of a defined claim. Additionally, the court maintained that inasmuch as Title 13 was enacted in regard to determining
the status of meadowlands, the different factors involved in classifying
oceanfront property militated against the exclusive implementation of
Title 13 procedures. Justice Schreiber concluded that, clearly, claims
could be "defined and asserted" in a manner different than that
enunciated in Title 13. Id. at 78-79, 469 A.2d at 8.
The majority agreed with the appellate division that portions of
the Council's map did not satisfy the requirement that the state specifically define the land it was claiming. In reaching this conclusion, the
court noted that the colored squares on the map indicated that the
state had made a thorough enough investigation to prepare a claim to
tidal lands. The uncolored squares, however, indicated that the state
had not prepared an overlay claim and the area may or may not
contain tideland claims. Id. at 81, 469 A.2d at 9. Justice Schreiber
posited that inasmuch as the photomaps were available to the public
since 1979, it was inconsistent to suggest that the tidelands amendment was intended simply to require the state to distribute maps
already available. Id. at 81-82, 469 A.2d at 9-10. In Justice Schreiber's
opinion, that type of interpretation would expropriate the people's
right to revise their constitution because in providing the state with an
additional year in which to define its claims, it was intended that the
state do more than that which was previously done. Accordingly,
although the majority concluded that where the state had advanced
far enough to designate the mean high water mark on its claim
overlay the "specific delineation requirement" had been met, it ruled
that the less detailed uncolored sections of the map did not constitute a
valid state assertion of a claim. Id. at 83-84, 469 A.2d at 10-11.
The court next dispensed with the plaintiffs' claim that the
amendment violated the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution since it would allow some property owners to acquire land
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from the state without payment while other property owners would
have to pay for land. The court observed that the only inquiry necessary was "whether a conceivable legitimate basis exists for the classification and whether the classification is rationally related to that
objective." Justice Schreiber concluded that the goal of the tidelands
amendment, eliminating uncertainties, was a legitimate end. Since
the court additionally reasoned that the amendment was rationally
related to the goal, it held that the equal protection clause was not
violated. Id. at 86-87, 469 A.2d at 12.
The majority also rejected plaintiffs' claim that the Fund was a
trust to which the State had irrevocably transferred its interest in the
tidelands and, accordingly, the Fund's deprivation of its tidelands
interests without due compensation was violative of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. Justice Schreiber again pointed out that the
people of the state have a right to amend their constitution and, since
the Fund is simply a creature of the state constitution, the people may
properly change its structure or even eliminate it. Id. at 87-88, 469
A.2d at 12-13.
The final issue addressed by the court was plaintiffs' assertion
that the amendment violated the contract clause of the United States
Constitution. Plaintiffs contended that school bonds issued after the
enactment of the New Jersey Reserve Act guaranteed the holders the
benefit of a reserve in the fund and the inability of the state to sell
riparian lands would diminish the security of the bonds. The majority
rejected this contention, maintaining that the amendment did not
infringe upon any of the financial conditions of the bonds. Justice
Schreiber pointed out that the Fund could be increased from other
revenues aside from the sale of riparian land, and that the financial
impact upon the bonds was speculative at best. Id. at 88-90, 469 A.2d
at 13-14.
Justice Handler, in a dissenting opinion, agreed with the court's
resolution of all the issues except the use of the Council's map in
determining state claims. Id. at 91, 469 A.2d at 14 (Handler, J.,
dissenting). The dissent reasoned that the purpose of the tidelands
amendment was to notify property owners that the state may have a
claim to their lands. Justice Handler concluded that the map fulfilled
this notification purpose and could be properly utilized by the state to
define and assert a claim. Id. at 95-96, 469 A.2d at 17 (Handler, J.,
dissenting).
In Dickinson, the court interpreted the tidelands amendment to
require the state to make a thorough investigation of tidal flowed land
in order to assert a claim. This interpretation serves the purpose of the
amendment, namely, to clear up the lack of certainty surrounding the
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ownership status of riparian land. A different interpretation by the
court only would have added more confusion to an already confused
situation.
Frances Panzini-Romeo
LANDLORD-TENANT-EVICTION-PROTECTION

OF

ANTI-EVIC-

TION ACT AVAILABLE ONLY TO THOSE WHOSE TENANCY Is PRIMAR-

RESIDENTIAL-Morristown Memorial Hosp. v. Wokein Mortgage & Realty Co., 192 N.J. Super. 182, 469 A.2d 515 (App. Div.
1983).
Morristown Memorial Hospital had leased twenty-six units of a
140-unit apartment complex since the mid-1960's and subleased them
to students and residents affiliated with the hospital. Under an arrangement with the former owner of the apartment complex, each
lease was renewed annually and the hospital was to select the tenants
despite a lease provision requiring landlord consent for any sublease.
In 1982, Wokem Mortgage & Realty Co. purchased the apartment
complex and refused to renew the lease. Wokem asserted that, because of the nature of the tenancy involved, renewal was not required
under the state Anti-Eviction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1
(West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984).
The hospital brought a declaratory judgment action to determine
whether its tenancy was within the scope of state legislation. Following a non-jury trial, the chancery division entered a judgment in the
hospital's favor. 192 N.J. Super. at 184, 469 A.2d at 516. The trial
court observed that the apartments were being used as residences and
that the Anti-Eviction Act affords protection to those premises leased
for residential purposes. The defendant appealed. Id. at 184-85, 469
A.2d at 517.
In reversing, the appellate court examined the legislative history
of the Act and found that it was intended to protect residential tenants
from involuntary displacement in a state where residential housing is
in short supply. As a result, the court interpreted the Act's phrase,
"leased for residential purposes," to mean that the lease's primary and
fundamental purpose must be residential. The court concluded that
since the plaintiff's lease was designed to serve the substantially nonresidential purpose of advancing the interests and needs of a hospital,
it was not covered by the Act. Id. at 186-87, 469 A.2d at 517-18.
The appellate court's decision limited the availability of tenant
protection under the Anti-Eviction Act to residential tenants. Thus,
landlords have another possible avenue of escape from undesirable
ILY
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tenancies, and industrial tenants have only their own negotiating skill
to protect them from a landlord's refusal to renew a lease.
Marian L. Cannell
CREDIT-DAMAGES-THIRD-PARTY

PROFESSIONAL

WHO

SUPPLIES

INFORMATION UPON WHICH LENDER RELIES IN MAKING LOAN NOT

To LENDER UNLESS LENDER RECOVERS LESS THAN VALUE
OF THE LOAN-Shadow Lawn Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Truhan,
192 N.J. Super. 96, 469 A.2d 94 (App. Div. 1983).
LIABLE

Shadow Lawn Savings and Loan Association (Shadow Lawn)
made a secured loan of $850,000 to Investors Development Company
(Investors). The loan incorporated a development agreement providing for an initial advance of $232,050 followed by a disbursement
schedule specifying sums to be paid upon the completion of numerous
on-site and off-site subdivision improvements. Shadow Lawn claimed
that the engineers hired to inspect Investors' job site issued certificates
verifying the stage of completion of the improvements on which the
bank relied in making its disbursements. Investors subsequently filed
for bankruptcy, and Shadow Lawn accepted a tract of land in exchange for an extinguishment of the Investor's loan balance. Shadow
Lawn sold the land and realized a $200,000 profit over the cancelled
loan obligation. Allegedly, however, the profit should have been
greater. Shadow Lawn claimed it was defrauded by the engineers by
their issuing of inaccurate certificates which resulted in Investors
being advanced $55,000 more than if accurate information had been
supplied. Shadow Lawn brought suit to recover the $55,000 from the
engineers. 192 N.J. Super. at 98-99, 469 A.2d at 95.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. The court reasoned that
Shadow Lawn, by voluntarily accepting the property in exchange for
extinguishment of the debt, had suffered no damages and therefore
had no cause of action. The plaintiff appealed to the appellate division.
In affirming, the appellate division recognized that a lender who
is expected to rely on a certificate of completion by a professional may
recover damages for economic loss sustained as a consequence of such
reliance. The court stated, however, that Shadow Lawn, as a lender,
was entitled only to the repayment of its loan to the developer. Since
the property received by the bank was more than equal to the value of
the debt, the court reasoned that plaintiff had suffered no damages in
relying on the engineers' inaccuracies. Accordingly, the court held
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that the action had been properly dismissed. See id. at 100, 469 A.2d
at 96.
The appellate division correctly concluded that there must be an
economic loss suffered by a third party who relied on a professional's
certificate before there may be recovery of damages. The court arrived at the proper conclusion by focusing on plaintiff's role as a
lender of money, not as the owner of the land. It was thus necessary
for the court to examine only whether plaintiff received repayment of
its loan in accordance with the agreement. If a lender receives property of value greater than the indebtedness in satisfaction of its loan,
the lender has been made whole and therefore rightly has no cause of
action.
Mary-Lynne Ricigliano
PRODUCTS LIABILITYTO WARN

WHERE THE

MANUFACTURERS
DANGER IS

NOT LIABLE

OBVIOUS,

FOR

FAILURE

WELL-KNOWN

AND

FireAVOIDABLE BY THE EXERCISE OF
stone Tire & Rubber Co., 192 N.J. Super. 251, 469 A.2d 943
(App. Div. 1983).
Plaintiff Campos sustained injuries when a three-piece wheel-rim
assembly, manufactured by defendant Firestone and sold to plaintiff's
employer, separated under the pressure of tire inflation during a
routine tire assembly. Although plaintiff was an experienced tire mechanic and he was well aware of the safety procedures designed to
protect a mechanic during inflation, plaintiff had reached into a steel
safety cage during inflation, an action which had caused him injury six
years before and one which he had been expressly instructed to refrain
from in the future. Both plaintiff's and defendant's experts testified
that the safety procedures were satisfactory to prevent injury during a
wheel-rim separation if they were complied with. In addition, defendant had provided plaintiff's employer with a wall chart outlining
these safety procedures, although there was no pictorial warning
which allegedly may have provided more protection for the illiterate
plaintiff.
Plaintiff brought an action against Firestone seeking damages.
He contended that the defect in defendant's product and its failure to
warn of the product's danger had caused plaintiff substantial injuries.
A jury verdict in the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, found
no design defect, but did find that defendant had failed to adequately
warn and awarded plaintiff $255,000 in damages. After defendant's
post-trial motions for judgment were denied, Firestone brought this
appeal. 192 N.J. Super. at 253-55, 469 A.2d at 944-45.
COMMON SENSE-Campos v.
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The appellate division defined the key issue to be whether Firestone had violated any legal duty to warn plaintiff of the product's
potential danger. The court held that Firestone, as a matter of law,
had breached no duty to warn and ruled that a manufacturer would
be exempted from strict tort liability for failure to warn where the risk
of danger is well-known and the hazard could be avoided by the
exercise of common sense drawn from the experience of the skilled
worker. Id. at 261-62, 469 A.2d at 949. The court reasoned that in the
present case, the danger was obvious and avoidable and additional
written or symbolic warnings would be of no use in protecting the
skilled industrial worker. Id. at 257, 469 A.2d at 946.
A lengthy dissent by Judge Dreier traced the New Jersey case law
development of strict tort liability for failure to warn. The dissent
emphasized that failure-to-warn cases have been treated under strict
liability principles rather than as mere negligence cases. Id. at 265-66,
469 A.2d at 951-52 (Dreier, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the manufacturer has an unqualified duty to distribute only defect-free products
into the marketplace and a duty to warn was not to be imposed as to a
particular user, but rather as to a class of users. Id. at 266, 469 A.2d at
952 (Dreier J., dissenting). The dissent rejected the majority's use of
the obvious danger rule, id. at 267, 469 A.2d at 952 (Dreier, J.,
dissenting), and found the "knowledgeable user" rule inappropriate
except as it applied to defining a duty owed to a class since the
subjective knowledge of the defendant should only bear upon the
proximate cause issue. Id. at 269-70, 469 A.2d at 953-54 (Dreier, J.,
dissenting). Judge Dreier asserted that a factual dispute amounting to
a jury question was raised as to the adequacy of the warning by an
absence of pictorial warnings on potentially hazardous products. Id.
at 270-71, 469 A.2d at 954.
The obvious intention of the majority was to avoid the application of rules of law which would result in the manufacturer becoming
the insurer for every product it distributes. The rationale of "risk
spreading," whereby the price of the item would reflect the total
product cost including injuries caused by defective products, was
found inapplicable in the instant case. Although the dissent believed
that a manufacturer's duty to warn should be measured as to a class of
users, it would be quite inequitable to allow recovery by a plaintiff
injured as a result of his impulsive act which was in complete disregard of an obvious and well-known danger. Moreover, even though
the majority discussed' the individual fault of the plaintiff, this plaintiff was surely a member of a class of skilled workers which should not
have been owed a duty to warn by Firestone.
Stephen Golia

